Verification Model: Cross-Check Logic, Hashing, and Evidence Bundles

Verification is the mechanism that lets an agency accept a platform-issued line instead of a physical site visit. This page documents the model. For the operator-facing workflow, see Verification. The model has four parts: source events, the cross-check, the tamper-evident hash, and the submission bundle. Each part has a defined schema so the system is auditable end-to-end.

Source events

A verification is always anchored to a source event that already exists on the platform. The event must carry a minimum set of fields for it to be verifiable.

Required field	Purpose
`event_id`	Stable identifier used across the audit trail.
`event_type`	`scout.completed`, `map.applied`, `alert.flood`, `harvest.declared`, `yield.snapshot`, …
`field_id` and `geometry`	The parcel the event applies to, as GeoJSON.
`occurred_at`	ISO 8601 timestamp of the event as reported by the actor.
`logged_at`	Timestamp when the event landed on the platform.
`actor`	Who reported it (user id, device id, or system).
`payload`	Event-specific measurements (e.g., `nitrogen_kg_per_ha`, `lesions_confirmed`, `water_extent_ha`).

If occurred_at and logged_at differ by more than 72 hours, the event is still eligible but the cross-check is marked with a late-log flag. Assessors decide whether to accept.

The cross-check

Each event type has a defined cross-check that compares the reported event against the independent satellite record.

Event type	Satellite source	Cross-check
`map.applied` (nitrogen VRA)	Sentinel-2, next clear pass within 14 days	NDRE delta ≥ +0.02 in treated zones vs pre-application baseline.
`scout.completed` (disease confirmed)	Sentinel-2, pass ±2 days	NDVI/NDRE anomaly present in the reported zones on or near the scout date.
`alert.flood`	Sentinel-1 SAR backscatter, pass ±3 days	Backscatter drop consistent with standing water; water-extent polygon derived.
`harvest.declared`	Sentinel-2, pass within 21 days	NDVI decline from peak of at least the crop-specific senescence delta.
`yield.snapshot` (season-end)	Multi-date Sentinel-2 composite across the full season	Season-integrated NDVI/NDRE consistent with the reported yield within the crop-specific tolerance.

Each cross-check produces a strength grade:

Grade	Criteria
Strong	Satellite pass within the ideal window, low cloud cover, delta metric clearly outside noise.
Moderate	Pass within the acceptable window OR partial cloud cover OR delta near threshold.
Weak	Pass outside ideal window, significant cloud cover, or metric close to noise floor. Submission allowed with explicit flag.
Fail	No usable pass in the window, or metric contradicts the reported event. Submission blocked.

The grade, the pass metadata, and the delta values all enter the evidence bundle. Nothing is hidden.

Tamper-evident hash

Each verification produces a SHA-256 hash over the canonical serialization of:

The source event (all fields above).
The satellite pass metadata used for the cross-check (source, tile id, acquisition time, cloud mask).
The measured delta values.
The cross-check grade and any flags.
The verification timestamp and platform version.

hash = sha256(canonical_json({
  event:      { ... },
  imagery:    [ { source, tile_id, acquired_at, cloud_pct }, ... ],
  crosscheck: { metric, baseline, observed, delta, grade, flags },
  meta:       { verified_at, platform_version }
}))

The hash is:

Deterministic - any party with the raw inputs can recompute it and confirm.
Bound to a specific imagery pass - swapping the satellite source or date changes the hash.
Recorded on submission - the agency stores the hash; auditors can request the raw inputs and recompute.

The hash is not a blockchain. It does not need to be. It is a portable, reproducible fingerprint that any third party can validate given the raw evidence bundle. Blockchain anchoring is optional and available for agencies that require it.

Evidence bundle

The bundle is what the agency actually receives. It is the same underlying content across all three submission formats; only the presentation differs.

verification:
  id: VRF-2026-06-15-A2-VRA-NITROGEN
  issued_at: 2026-06-17T04:22:00Z
  platform_version: 2026.06.1
  hash: sha256:9f2a...c81b

subject:
  field_id: fld_01j8xyz
  field_name: A2
  region: MY-Kedah
  estate_id: est_muda_01
  organization_id: org_loyal_primus
  area_ha: 4.2
  geometry: { ... GeoJSON ... }

event:
  event_id: evt_01j9vra
  event_type: map.applied
  occurred_at: 2026-06-15T09:14:00+08:00
  logged_at:   2026-06-15T09:47:00+08:00
  actor: { user_id: usr_operator_maria }
  payload:
    map_id: map_01j9ghi
    input: nitrogen
    zones: [{ zone: low, rate_kg_ha: 150 }, ...]
    coverage_ha: 4.2

crosscheck:
  metric: ndre_delta
  baseline: { source: sentinel-2, acquired_at: 2026-06-14T03:41:00Z, ndre: 0.22 }
  observed: { source: sentinel-2, acquired_at: 2026-06-16T03:39:00Z, ndre: 0.26, cloud_pct: 4 }
  delta: +0.04
  threshold: +0.02
  grade: strong
  flags: []

narrative: >
  Nitrogen VRA (map_01j9ghi) applied to field A2 (4.2 ha) on 15 Jun 2026.
  Sentinel-2 pass on 16 Jun 2026 confirmed a +0.04 NDRE lift over pre-application
  baseline of 14 Jun 2026, exceeding the +0.02 threshold. Cloud cover 4%.

chain_of_custody:
  - stage: event.logged        at: 2026-06-15T09:47:00+08:00
  - stage: imagery.acquired    at: 2026-06-16T03:39:00Z
  - stage: crosscheck.computed at: 2026-06-16T05:12:00Z
  - stage: verification.issued at: 2026-06-17T04:22:00Z

Submission formats

All three preset submission formats are projections over this bundle. They differ in layout and in which optional sections are included.

Section	Subsidy	Takaful	NADMA
Verification header (id, hash, timestamps)	✓	✓	✓
Subject (parcel, area, estate, organization)	✓	✓	✓
Event log	✓	✓	✓
Cross-check summary	✓	✓	✓
Pre / post imagery thumbnails	optional	✓	✓
Loss narrative + yield-at-risk		✓	✓
Flood-extent GeoJSON polygon			✓
Chain of custody	✓	✓	✓
Agency-specific form fields	✓	✓	✓

Agency-specific form fields are provided by each agency and mapped once by the platform. New agencies onboard by supplying the field mapping; the underlying bundle does not change.

Confidence, not certainty

A verification confirms consistency between two independent records: what the platform user logged, and what the satellite captured. It does not, and cannot, prove intent or interior quality.

What it proves: an operation of the reported type occurred on the reported parcel within the imagery window.
What it does not prove: the identity of the operator, the specific product used, or off-parcel activity.

Assessors retain discretion. Verification is designed to move the default from “prove it with a site visit” to “accept unless flagged”, with the flags surfaced honestly in the bundle.

Auditing an existing verification

Any party with the verification id and the raw evidence bundle can:

Retrieve the referenced imagery from the named source (Sentinel-2, Sentinel-1) using the tile id and acquisition timestamp.
Recompute the cross-check metric against the reported geometry.
Recompute the SHA-256 hash over the canonical serialization.
Confirm the recomputed hash matches the one stored by the agency.

If any step fails, the verification is invalid and the agency has grounds to reject the submission even after initial approval. This is what makes it tamper-evident: falsification requires forging an independent satellite record.

Verification - the operator-facing workflow.
Risk Model - source of many verifiable events.
Field Data Model - the parcel identity used in every bundle.
Imagery Sources - the satellite feeds the cross-check draws on.
Aggregation Model - how verifiable field-level evidence supports estate, regional, and national rollups.

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Verification Model: Cross-Check Logic, Hashing, and Evidence Bundles

Source events

The cross-check

Tamper-evident hash

Evidence bundle

Submission formats

Confidence, not certainty

Auditing an existing verification

​Source events

​The cross-check

​Tamper-evident hash

​Evidence bundle

​Submission formats

​Confidence, not certainty

​Auditing an existing verification

​Related

Source events

The cross-check

Tamper-evident hash

Evidence bundle

Submission formats

Confidence, not certainty

Auditing an existing verification

Related